Fordham Law Review
Volume 14

Issue 2

Article 8

1945

Book Reviews

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Book Reviews, 14 Fordham L. Rev. 258 (1945).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol14/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

apparently indicated in the Treasury Regulations. If hardships result from the
application of the common law definition, it would seem that the sounder view is
that taken by the court in Williams v. United States,41 that any extension of the
coverage under the Act is for Congress to decide rather than for the courts, which
are historically supposed to be without power to legislate.

BOOK REVIEWS
TRIBUNALS, PAST AND FUTURE. By Manley 0. Hudson. Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1944. Pp. xii, 287.
$2.50.
No one in our country or elsewhere is more capable of writing upon this important
subject than Judge Manley 0. Hudson. By reason of his great learning and a lifetime devoted to the study of international law as well as his experience in connection
with many international conferences and his distinguished services on the Permanent Court of International Justice, he has a very complete and profound knowledge
of this subject. He has also performed a most useful function at the Conference
in San Francisco in bringing his counsel and aid in the reorganization of the International Court of Justice. His book cannot but be interesting and informative to
any lawyer devoted to public law and to our foreign relations.
We are confronted for the second time in the first half of the Twentieth Century
with the problem of organizing the world so as to maintain peace, at least long
enough to give civilization a chance to recover from a devastating world conflict,
and to afford mankind an opportunity to resume that march of progress which
was so rudely interrupted in 1914. If man could not learn anything from the past,
then there would be little hope for the future; yet, it is not utopian to believe that
lessons of history may not go wholly unheeded, and now that the moment has
arrived with such complete Allied victory, world reorganization becomes the paramount problem, and we must hope that the experience of the past may be wisely
utilized in the reorganization of the relations between the nations--so disrupted
by the most devastating war of all time.
Between 1919 and 1939 a great experiment in organizing the judicial settlement
of international disputes was attended with a very considerable measure of success.
although a strong parochialism in the United States Senate prevented our adherence
to the first real world tribunal that mankind had ever attempted. Today this tribunal
is, in all its essential features, reaffirmed by the United Nations, and again will
reestablish permanently, I trust, a Court with a large general jurisdiction over those
legal controversies which may arise among the nations.
It is, therefore, very opportune that at this moment Judge Hudson should have
written a book on International Tribunals indicating what those tribunals have been
able to accomplish in the past, what was their structure and general organization.
their procedure and the law applied by them. On all these questions he has written
with clarity and precision and has made it possible for those interested in international law to understand readily the methods that have been employed during
the last one hundred and fifty years to effect judicial settlements in a great variety
of controveries.
INTERNATIONAL

41. 126 F. (2d)
L. REv. 586.

129 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 750 (1943), 36 ILL.
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It was the Treaty of 1794 between the United States and Great Britain, known
as the Jay Treaty, which provided for three mixed commissions to deal with questions not otherwise disposed of in the negotiation of the Treaty. Nearly six hundred
awards or judgments were rendered by those commissions after the fullest argument
and discussion of the merits of the claims; this was a very real epoch in the history
of judicial settlement. Since then, there have been a great number of arbitrations,
especially between the United States and Great Britain, and some of them, like
the Bering Sea controversy, the Fisheries question and the Venezuela Boundary
Line, excited much national feeling.
It was out of this long series of arbitrations taking place in the Nineteenth Century, that the Permanent Court of International Justice grew. There arose a strong
sentiment in the United States in favor of the substitution of law for that of force,
and it was felt that many controversies, otherwise dangerous to the peace of nations,
might be adjusted by law rather than by a resort to war.
The question of the jurisdiction of such a court has always been one of difficulty
and was much discussed by eminent lawyers throughout the world before the subject
was formulated in the statute of the Permanent Court. It is there provided that
the jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all classes of legal disputes concerning:
(a) The Interpretation of a treaty;
(b) Any question of International law;
(c) The existence of any fact, which, if established would constitute a breach
of an international obligation;
(d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
It is, therefore, interesting to note that the statutes also provided what law the
Permanent Court should apply. Article 38 reads: "The Court . . . shall apply:
a. international conventions whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law."
This is little more than a codification of the general principles observed by international tribunals heretofore in reaching their conclusions. International law is in
the main either customary, that is, the usual rules observed by nations in their
intercourse, or the law found in treaties and general conventions. The recent practice of multiple conventions has been termed "international legislation," although
it is of consensual origin and no real international legislation has existed.
There are, of course, limitations to international judicial settlement and it has
been felt widely that causes of war were frequently not of a justiciable character,
that is, controversies which might be resolved justly in accordance with existing
rules of law. It had been the custom to exempt from arbitration matters of "vital
interest and national honor." This put largely out of the purview of judicial settlement the most important international questions. I think the tendency is against
this narrow view, and the hope for the future lies in the extension of the groups
of categories subject to judicial settlement. Many had hoped that the jurisdiction
of the Permanent Court might have been made compulsory, but apparently it was
thought impossible to do this at the present time, although there is hope that most
of the nations may take advantage of the so-called Optional Clause, which is an
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agreement to submit to judicial settlement all questions that may come within the
defined jurisdiction of the Court.
In summation it may be said that much could be accomplished for international
peace through the use of the instrumentalities primarily of the International Court,
and secondly, if nations choose, by the establishment of ad hoc special international
tribunals. It is not universally true that great questions which arouse national
feelings are not susceptible of judicial settlement. Such famous arbitrations as the
Bering Sea, the Atlantic Fisheries and the Venezuela Boundary cases, prove that
at least among the English-speaking people such a result is not impossible.
While in form the San Francisco Conference created a new Court, in fact the
continuity between the old Court and the new Court has not been broken. The
word "Permanent" was left out of the title of the Court, and the name "International Court of Justice" was adopted without discussion. The Charter states in
Article 92 that "the new statute is based upon the statute of the Permanent Court
of International Justice." The very numbering of the Articles of the old statute
has been retained and most of those Articles are retained verbatim, or modified very
slightly. Thus both in appearance and in substance the principal features of the old
Court are retained and the succession of the new Court is expressly envisaged in
several Articles in the new statute. With the general acceptance by the United
Nations of the Charter, the institution of an International Court will be again reaffirmed and, while its jurisdiction is not made compulsory, many if not all of the
states will adopt ultimately the so-called Optional Clause, thus assenting to the
jurisdiction of the Court in all justiciable controversies to which they may be parties.
If the inventive genius of man seems, since 1914, at least, to have been devoted
largely to the creation of instrumentalities for his own destruction, we may also
say that the Charter, with its readoption of the Court of International Justice
furnishes a not inadequate instrument by which nations may, if they so desire,
substitute methods of law, conciliation and diplomacy for those of war. Unless there
is a fair prospect of their so doing, the future of the human race cannot be envisaged without dark forebodings.
The future of international judicial settlement rests upon the willingness of the
nations to refrain from war as a means of carrying out their national policies.
Recent experience would seem to indicate that unless some such result is reached
modem methods of destruction may bring about the end of homo sapiens on this
troubled planet, in which event the problems relating to international tribunals will
become academic. If, however, there be enough intelligence and morality among
the nations to preserve civilization from total destruction, one of the most useful
instrumentalities toward this end will be the Court of International Justice-a result
which can only be brought about if the man of the future can develop the morality
and intelligence necessary to maintain his existence as a civilized being and the
perpetuation of a world in which some measure of decency and justice may prevail.
FREDERIC R. COUDERTt

t Member de l'Institut de Droit International; President, American Society of International Law.
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By Hamilton Vreeland, Jr. New York: Charles
Pp. iv, 171. $2.00.

TWlMGHT OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY.

Scribner's Sons.

1944.

Into this compact volume that is no longer than some briefs submitted to the
United States Supreme Court or than some of its recent opinions, Dr. Hamilton
Vreeland, Jr., an eminent authority upon international and constitutional law, has
made crystal clear what he aptly calls the Twilight of Individifal Liberty into which
the New Deal Supreme Court has led the unsuspecting and unaware nation. Whether
this twilight is to be followed by nightfall or is merely the penumbra of a short
eclipse remains to be seen. The book gains greatly in significance by the unexpected
change of presidential administration almost simultaneously with the end of the
war danger because, for the first time in many years, the American people are able
to take their governmental bearings.
The history of the United States has been, in one respect, a cyclical rise and fall
of executive power to meet national emergencies requiring untrammeled action at
the expense of checks and balances. This resiliency has enabled the structure erected
in 1789 to withstand the shock of every crisis. Throughout this period, however,
there has remained an independent judiciary enforcing or, what has been often
equally effective, standing ready to enforce constitutional restrictions upon the other
two of the three separate branches of the government carefully devised by the
framers out of the wisdom of the eighteenth century political philosophers who lit
the lamp of modem freedom.
The American Constitution has been used as a model for many others that in
practice have become dead-letters and it is of the most vital importance that, from
time to ime, we chart our position, as Dr. Vreeland does so brilliantly in this
work, because our liberties not only can be swept away by conspicuous and dramatic
executive usurpation or by equally open legislative excess (the fly-leaf quotes Jefferson's celebrated remark that an elective despotism was not the government we
fought for) but also by the almost imperceptible judicial erosion of the restraints.
The book is a shining reminder of the fundamental precept that general principle
must not yield to the temptation of the particular occasion, so eloquently expressed
by Wordsworth in describing his happy warrior: "And through the heat of conflict
keeps the law in calmness made and sees what he foresaw."
The scope of Dr. Vreeland's study is epitomized in this paragraph of the
Introduction:
"We have, in the last ten years, witnessed an enormous extension of Federal power and
liberty. I am
a considerable extension of State power, both at the expense of individual
not speaking of war power and statutes and orders based thereon." 1
This change has occurred since 1937 and may be traceable to the dissenting
opinions before that of the late Justice Holmes. What Dr. Vreeland has to say
about the influence of Justice Holmes upon individual liberty is enlightening and
almost sensational in view of the lustre that has crowned the reputation of that
great jurist. The author interprets the Holmes philosophy, as revealed by his written
expositions, as having been based upon the view that the essence of law is force, the
direct negation of the theory of so-called natural law and of the concept of absolute
truth, the Holmes utterances amounting to an euphemistic way of saying that
might makes right. Dr. Vreeland reaches the conclusion that:
1.. P. i.

262
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"Instead of the humanitarian liberal whom his admirers see, his written words disclose
him as a cynic and sceptic, who not only expressed little concern for human liberty but
was generally indifferent to it, except in respect of the liberties of thought and expression."2
In tracing back the political philosophy of Justice Holmes to certain of the
eighteenth century philosophers, the author may not be entirely fair to the latter,
particularly Locke, but that is of minor importance. Dr. Vreeland does not leave
the reader in doubt as to where he himself stands with respect to what he calls
the "persistent strokes of a brilliant pen" wielded by Holmes.
"There can be no place for such a philosophy in the basic law of a free people. If it
becomes so embedded, we shall no longer be free, because individual liberties of minorities
3
will fall beneath the chariot wheels of political liberty, that is, the right to vote."
The conclusion arrived at, after a thorough and objective analysis of the relevant
decisions of the Supreme Court since 1937, projected against the historical background, not only of the United States but of the long struggle for individual rights
since the days of the Roman Empire, with all of which the author has a rich
familiarity and in presenting which he is never the least bit pedantic or pedagogic,
is that the due process clause has been transformed from a substantive safeguard
to a rather empty assurance of formal regularity.
The encroachments upon individual liberty were made both by the several states
and by the central government.
The former were able to accomplish this by the weakening of Federal constitutional restraints in construing the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
What is almost sensational in Dr. Vreeland's analysis is the tracing of this trend
unmistakably to the jurist hailed as the arch-liberty of the age.
"This theory that power or might makes right action was a favorite one of Mr. Justice
Holmes, particularly in the fields of conflict of laws and constitutional law, which is
where Blackstone v. Miller4 rests. How he acquired that philosophy would make an interesting study, but it is unquestionably related to his belief that the due process clauses
do not protect substantive and jurisdictional rights but only relate to formal methods of
procedure. More will be said of this in the following chapter, but in plain language it
means that, as far as the due process clauses are concerned, a legislature can deprive a
person of his property, liberty, or even his life as long as the operating statute is regularly
passed. It is the theory of legislative absolutism against which this book is written." 5
Without attempting to become an amateur psycho-analyst and explain either the
origin of Holmes' anti-liberalism or influence upon his colleagues, Dr. Vreeland suggests that the cause of Holmes' attitude
"... is clearly and definitely and directly connected with his physical powier theory
of valid sovereign action, and it seems probable that both theories are to some extent
rooted psychologically in his Civil War experiences. Clearly they are expressions of his
basic philosophy as revealed by his writings. It was this: Jurisdiction is power. Might
makes right. The essence of law is force. Natural law concepts of right and wrong have
no place in law. There is no absolute truth. The sanctity of human life is overemphasized.
Man may be sacrificed to the good of the state and minorities to the prevailing force of
majorities." 6

While the Supreme Court, under the influence of the Holmes philosophy, held
2.

P. 102.

3. P. 102.
4.

188 U. S. 189 (1903).

5. P. 72.
6. P. 101.
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that the due process clause was not to be construed as an effective restraint upon
state invasions of individual rights, a philosophy leading directly toward the tempting
fallacies of dictatorship, Congress was given a free hand to work its social will
regardless of the individual. Only when dictatorships abroad burst into exaggerated
extremities, absurdities, terrors and catastrophies did the American public fully
realize that any omnipotent-which is another way of saying any unrestrainedgovernment tan damage and destroy any part or all of its subjects-the citizens
of such a government are necessarily subjects-but, with even the most noble intentions in the world, even with an idealistic benevolence, would lack the wisdomfor humanity lacks the wisdom-to improve its people. Any doctor can kill but
to preserve and improve life is a far less simple problem. It was in blissful forgetfulness of what had been learned through bitter suffering by the Lockes, Montesquieus, Paines and Franklins of the eighteenth century that the Holmes-led
Supreme Court began to loosen the constitutional brakes upon the Congress.
This was accomplished by a dilution of the strength of the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment which the author demonstrates is the source, practically
speaking, of "all protection of individual rights against the Federal government."
The due process restraint of the Fifth Amendment upon the Federal government
and the due process restraint of the Fourteenth Amendment upon the states were
weakened by the same transmogrification of the meaning of that clause:
"To accomplish this it was necessary to change the traditional meaning and scope of
the due process clause to such an extent that the substantive due process test was practically
eliminated from the cases, that is, the test which would deny validity to a statute if it
was unreasonable or arbitrary or capricious or had no substantial relation to the end
sought to be attained. . . .Those cases, decided since 1937, mean that substantively the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does no. more than protect against the
invasion by States of some of the rights specified in the First Amendment as protected
against Federal action, and that substantively the due process clause of the 7Fifth Amendment means nothing as a protection against the exertion of Federal power."
Perhaps the most important contribution of the book is the refutation of the
modern notion, dignified and indeed given authority by the opinion of the Supreme
Court, that the due process clause historically-before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment-merely had procedural meaning.
"They are wrong in substance and implication because the truth is that up to the very
time that due process began to have real substantive significance the doctrines of natural
law were protecting individual substantive rights."s
Dr. Vreeland shows that the application of substantive due process occurred
in many of the pre-Civil War decisions of state courts. Then he reaches his inspiring and magnificent interpretation of due process as the deliberately intended and
legitimate child of the age-old doctrine of natural law, the crystallization into the
constitutional phraseology of the principle of the rights of man:
"The true interpretation of these constitutional phrases is, that where rights are acquired
by the citizen under the existing law, there is no power in any branch of the government
to take them away." 9
The issue is sharp and Dr. Vreeland's book makes it clear. In his view, which
he shows has sound historical support, the principle of the due process
7. P. 99.

8. P. 115.
9. P. 119.
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"confers a positive right that the treatment by government of all persons shall conform
with a standard below which government may not go in the treatment of human beings."'1
This is the doctrine that the liberals of the world now are seeking to have recognized as universal.
But the recent decisions of the Supreme Court have followed the divergent trail
blazed by Holmes and proclaimed with shocking candor by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in an article published in 1939, the year that he ascended to that bench: "The due
process clauses ought to go."':1
Every judge and lawyer, every editor and other leader of public opinion, and
every intelligent citizen should realize what has been done to weaken our constitutional structure at its base. Dr. Vreeland's book may be read in a few hours
and its message should be taken to mind and heart. With all of its wholesome fervor,
it never betrays the rigid objectivity of sound scholarship and the authorities are
cited in the notes, unobtrusively contained in an appendix, so that the skeptical reader
may check Dr. Vreeland's interpretations against his own.
EDWIN A. FALK-

AND THE LAW IN ACTION.
By Charles S. Rhyne. Washington,
D. C.: National Institute of Municipal Law of Municipal Law Officers. 1945.
Pp. 500. $10.00.
Significant of the matters contained in the eighth annual volume of Municipalities and the Law in Action (1945 Edition) is the subtitle "A Record of City
Experience Covering the Third Year of the War." The index (from abattoirs, under
OPA, to zoning) consumes 44 of its 500 pages. One might be dismayed at
examining this large volume in order to obtain general legal information even on
municipal law. Such, however, is not its purpose. It is a clinical compendium of
problems confronting a special group of practising lawyers, city attorneys. For
that reason it cannot be a mere academic treatise. Many practical suggestions and
much sound advice are contained in its pages.
The volume appropriately opens with a message from President Roosevelt, reading in part as follows:
"The agenda . . . embraces some of the most vital questions to be faced by our muncdpalities not only while the war is progressing but in the all important period of rehabilitation and reconstruction which is to follow. It is of the utmost importance that immediate
steps be taken to correlate municipal programs with Federal plans. I trust therefore
that your deliberations will be guided by the wise counsels and
that a constructive
approach will be made to the vital problems under consideration."1
MUNICIPALITIES

It can fairly be said that in this volume that constructive approach is achieved. It is
one of the most valuable in the series of eight which began in 1938, and constitutes
a report of the year's legal experiences of American cities. Some of the troublesome
municipal problems finally decided by the highest courts have their beginnings in
the diverse reports contained in these volumes. For that reason alone, this series
of books would be unique as source material.
10.
11.

P. 126.
P. 138; FRAr~uR

ER, LAW AND PoLIncs (1939)

f

Member of the New York Bar.

1.

P. 12.

16.
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Every phase of municipal activity is analytically reported upon-public housing,
city planning, taxation, municipally-owned utilities, city contracts, civil liberties,
municipal bonds, tort liability, city-state relations, Federal-city relations, and many
others.
There is a comprehensive and extremely timely chapter on public housing. We
are informed that FPHA will give preference in the sale of permanent housing
that is adaptable for individual homes to present or prospective occupants, with
special consideration given to veterans. Preference will also be extended to nonprofit mutual ownership corporations operating for the benefit of their tenant members. To unload the entire stock of war housing upon the real estate market would
have disruptive effects in many localities. Accordingly, it is suggested that those
projects that are suitable be turned over to local housing authorities for low-rent
public housing in areas where there is a great need for housing for low-income
families.
It has also been found practicable to move surplus temporary housing to localities
where the need for such housing is most acute. Some experiments have been made
in cutting buildings into panels, moving the sections to other sites and re-assembling
them there. In one such experiment, sections were moved 180 miles and re-erected
in their original form as part of a new project. In another such operation, a twostory structure, consisting of 16 units, was converted into four one-story buildings
of four units each. Tests also indicate the feasibility of disposing of some of the
units by removing these structures to farms or industrial sites to be converted
into utility buildings. In large cities, however, the use of temporary housing is a
much debated subject, because of the complicated sewer and utility problems created
thereby.
Recommendations to re-use these units as temporary reconstruction buildings in
bombed European areas have met with some favor. Indeed, interest has been
shown by several European countries in the purchase of dismantled dwellings for
shipment abroad. Since demolition costs normally exceed the sales value of the
salvaged materials, these new avenues of disposal will help reduce government loss.
An added advantage is that the actual useful life of the properties will be prolonged
after their original housing purpose has been accomplished.
Housing authorities have received from FPHA applications for financial aid for
low-rent and slum clearance projects, to be added to a post-war shelf for preferential treatment when conditions are ripe. Here, it is perhaps not out of place, in a
review of this practical volume, to make a practical suggestion. Cities should begin
immediately to make their local surveys and to adopt appropriate resolutions.
Federal moneys will always be allocated to the city that is ready with definite plans
and construction blueprints. Moneys will not be allocated to cities which have
nebulous construction plans for the future.
Urban redevelopment through private corporations is also adequately treated.
Bills patterned after the New York urban redevelopment laws are recommended for
adoption by states throughout the Union. In these cases inducement is given to
private agencies through the device of tax exemption which may extend over a period
of years. A notable instance of this type of project is the Stuyvesant Town development in New York in the area previously known as the "gas house" district. Interesting legal questions presented by this kind of project, including the right of the
City to condemn the land, were passed on finally in Murray v. LaGuardia.2 This
2. 291 N. Y. 320 (1943); cert. denied, 321 U. S. 771 (1944).
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is the first housing development in New York City authorized under the Redevelopment Companies Law (L. 1943, ch. 234).
Cities are interested in acquiring some of the huge stock of surplus property
which the Government has accumulated. In order to avoid the necessity of purchasing through private profiteers, cities have been insisting upon a preferred position
among buyers of this property. Through the Surplus Property Act of 1944, such
preference has been established in the law.
The sections on taxation point out that the main source of municipal revenue
is the real estate tax, established when ownership of land "was a badge of independence, responsibility and wealth." The financial status of cities as well as of
taxpayers is affected by the ever increasing rolls of tax-exempt property. Sound,
hard thinking on the re-establishment of the base for municipal taxation is imperative. This is a problem for state legislatures rather than for cities. In Michigan,
an amendment to the state constitution, which would require that state to reimburse
cities for all revenues lost in this way, has been proposed.
We are also reminded that the tax-exempt rolls have been further augmented by
the acquisition of land by the Federal Government. As a result, the financial
stability of many cities might have been strained if the war had continued much
longer. Some criticism has been heard that the Government has permitted itself in
some instances to be used as a cloak by certain war contractors in order to escape
local taxation. Under the shelter of government ownership of their properties it
is claimed that many have achieved undeserved tax exemption. This situation is
graphically highlighted by the startling fact that 24% of the land area of the continental United States is owned by the Federal Government. In Arizona government
ownership is 73%; in California 46%; in New Mexico 44%; in Wyoming 51%;
and in Utah 72%.
However, Congress has expressly declared that property of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation and the Defense Plant Corporation shall be taxable. 3 This
is also the case with a dozen other government corporations or agencies. In addition, Congress has recognized the gravity of the plight of municipalities by organizing the combined Congressional Public Lands Committee under the chairmanship
of Hon. J. Hardin Peterson of Florida. It has held hearings all over the country
and has prepared an Interim Report, 4 setting forth factual data on the municipal
loss of assessable property by reason of exempt Federal ownership. Approximately
50 bills have been introduced in Congress proposing remedial legislation.
Although his committee has not yet acted, Mr. Peterson has unofficially expressed_
the viewpoint that some of the recommendations of the committee should be:
(1) The Government should pay taxes, or an amount in lieu thereof, on land
held in a proprietary capacity.
(2) In the disposition of surplus Federal property, the purchaser should assume
the burden of local taxes.
(3) Local units should be permitted to tax where the Federal ownership is
technical, the beneficial interest being in private parties.
(4) Immediate return of land to private ownership after Federal use of land
has ended.
There is a chapter on tax lien foreclosure in rem, a matter of vital importance
to all municipalities. The Land Tax Collection Act of Jackson County, Missouri,
3.

55 STAT. 248 (1941), 15 U. S. C. A. § 610 (Supp. 1940).

4.

H. R. REP. No. 1884.
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predicated on Title 3, of Article 7-A of the Tax Law of the State of New York,
"Foreclosure of Tax Lien by Action in Rem" is discussed at length. The Missouri
Supreme Court enz banc on July 31, 1944, upheld the constitutionality of the Act.5
The foreclosure in rem statute has not been used in the City Of New York because
at present it is mandatory to foreclose all tax liens. An attempt on the part of the
New York State Legislature to permit selection of tax liens for foreclosure was
vetoed by the Governor in 1945.
Treated also is the question of zoning. Cities have relaxed their zoning ordinances
to allow for war conditions. Permits granted under this relaxation of zoning ordinances require that the uses permitted during the war period be terminated within
six months after the end of the war. As a result, many legal problems will confront
city attorneys in this connection. Mention may also be made of airport zoning to
protect the approaches of publicly-owned airports from obstructions.
One of the practical hints on proposed Federal subsidies to aviation is contained
in the opposition by the Institute of Municipal Law Officers to Federal payments
to the respective states, to be doled out by them to municipalities. It is suggested
that direct payments be made to the municipal owners of airports, thus avoiding
"in-between" agencies, as suggested by the Randolph Bill.6
Some may say that the material contained in this volume might have been substantially condensed by omitting duplication. Reiteration occasionally results from
the fact that the functions of several of the committees overlap, resulting at times
in double treatment of the same subject matter. However, the duplicated items serve
in most instances to add an accent to some urgently important matters which cut
across different fields of municipal law.
It would be a gross understatement merely to report that the volume under
review is worthwhile. For those who are not only engaged in, but interested in,
municipal law, this volume is essential. It makes no pretense at being a philosophy
of municipal law; it bears the styles of too many hands to have coherence; but
it is history of current municipal activity hot off the griddle-a volume to which
the practising municipal law officer and even those less directly interested in these
problems, including the ever increasing number of law students studying this subject,
may turn with considerable profit. Because of space limitations, this review can
give but a cursory view of the many and important subjects of municipal law
which are of vital importance in the general legal pattern of the nation.
As a result of the war's end, many new city problems will have to be faced.
Those involving government contracts, the civil service status of returning soldiers,
their rights on entrance to civil service and on restoration to civil service are
but a few of them. The city counsellor can be of inestimable help in bridging the
stream of reconversion from war to peaetime activities. This volume gives the
reader considerable insight into his mental approach to this desired result and into
the methods employed by him in his efforts to solve some of the problems involved
in this process.
JULIUS IsAAcsj

5. Spitcaufsky v. Hatten, 353 Mo. 94,

182 S. W: (2d) 86 (1944).
H. R. REP. No. 5024.
t Assistant Corporation Counsel of the City of New York from 1934 to date, and.
since 1938 chief of the Division of Real Estate and Condemnation.
6.
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St. Louis: The

This book constitutes a treasury of sources for the Thomist scholar. Its purpose
is to supplement the Bibliographie Thomiste, published 1921 in Belgium by the
Dominican Fathers, Mandonnet (famous authority on St. Thomas and St. Dominic)
and Destrez. That work listed some 2,219 items, arranged under analytical indexes.
The present work is particularly important, because no general bibliography of
Thomism or Scholastic material has appeared since 1921. The Modem Schoolman
in 1933 and 1941 did carry two lists of books on the philosophia perennis, but in
each case no attempt was made to list any but the more important works.
The present work must have required painstaking research and much scholarship
from its author, Doctor Bourke, Associate Professor of Philosophy at St. Louis
University, and author of the recently published St. Augustine's Quest of Wisdom.
Dr. Bourke includes articles from learned magazines as well as books.
After an introduction which describes the nature of the Bibliography, a chronology
of the life of St. Thomas and a chronological list of his works, Dr. Bourke divides
his Bibliography into six main parts (and a very extensive set of indexes). These
parts deal with previous bibliographies, the life and personality of St. Thomas,
the works of St. Thomas, his philosophical doctrines, theological doctrines, and
doctrinal and historical relations (for example, St. Thomas and the Greeks and
Romans, St. Thomas and the Arabs, St. Thomas and the Fathers, etc.).
For law review purposes, the works collected under the headings of Ethics,
Social and Economic Philosophy, and Political and Legal Philosophy are most
interesting; particularly, the latter. One hundred and seventy-two references are
made to materials on political or legal philosophy. Of these only twenty-five are in
English, and of these twenty-five, thirteen are single essays in learned magazines or
books. The outstanding English books (as distinguished from mere essays or doctoral
dissertations from Catholic University) are disappointingly few. They include three
works by Jacques Maritain: The Things That Are Not Caesar's, Freedom in the
Modern World, and Scholasticism and Politics, all works which no one interested in
jurisprudence can afford to miss, even though they do not deal with jurisprudence
ex professo.
Of course, no bibliography of this kind can be completely exhaustive; nor does
it pretend to be. But, it covers the field in a fairly satisfactory manner. This makes
it all the more remarkable that during the twenty year period involved, no important
work on jurisprudence as such should have been discovered by Dr. Bourke among
Thomist or Scholastic sources. That is a rather sad record for Thomist scholarship.
It indicates a crying need. Moreover, it explains why positivistic legal philosophy
enjoys such unchallenged and uncriticized vogue, outside of Thomism. The latter
has trained against it only a desultory drumfire of magazine articles.
This is not to say that there are not excellent works covering one or the other
aspect of jurisprudence in this bibliography. I have already mentioned the extremely valuable works of Maritain. Deserving very high place are such lectures
as Y. R. Simon's Nature and Functions of Authority, (Aquinas lecture of 1940,
delivered at Marquette University, and pubilshed by that University); Mortimer
Adler's essay, A Question About Law, which in the opinion of this reviewer makes
a valuable contribution to the study of the natural law, discriminating as it does
between positive law and the natural law; Father Walter Farrell's essay, The Fate
of Representative Government. (Adler's and Farrell's essays are included in a
symposium entitled Essays in Thomism.)

BOOK REVIEWS
The author unfortunately made no effort to include law review articles. In view
of his inclusion of doctoral dissertations from Catholic University, I wonder why he
omitted the useful, if not very significant text, on Jurisprudence by LeBuffe and
Hayes. Moreover, since he included such a work as Joad's Guide to the Philosophy
of Morals and Politics, because it devoted some four pages out of. eight hundred
and sixteen to St. Thomas, I see no reason why he omitted such works as Sorokin's
Social and Cultural Dynamics (1937); Dickinson's The Stateman's Book of John
of Salisbury (1927); Pollock's Essays in the Law (1922), (especially for its chapter
on the "Law of Nature"); the second volume of Dunning's History of Political
Theories (1923); Maitland's Translation (1922) of Gierke's Political Theories of
the Middle Ages; Barker's Introduction to Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of
Society (1934); and Haine's The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (1934).
GODFREY ScHMIDrn'

SELECTION AND TENUE OF JIuGEs. By Evan Haynes. Washington, D. C.: National
Conference of Judicial Councils. 1944. Pp. xix, 308.
The purpose of this book, as stated in the author's preface, is "to provide a
reasonably full collection, in one place, of the essential data bearing on the technique
of judicial selection." Such has been the function of the other volumes of the
Judicial Administration Series in their respective fields, and all have done well,
especially George Warren's Traffic Courts, which has served as a textbook and handbook in the current nation-wide traffic court improvement program.
There is a great need for a similar textbook and handbook in the field of judicial
selection and tenure. None has ever been attempted before, and the literature on
the subject is widely scattered throughout the professional periodicals. Interest has
been rising, and every year sees judicial selection improvement campaigns in progress
in various states. A major problem of 'those in charge of the campaigns has been
to acquire information as to what has gone before, what the problems are, what
mistakes and what progress have been made elsewhere, and what lines the current
thinking on the subject is taking. This volume will serve that purpose to a slight
extent, but much less adequately than might have been hoped.
The material supplied, in order of practical usability, may be listed as follows:
A twenty-four-page tabulation of present (1944) methods of selection of judges
in all states and territories, with constitutional and statutory citations. These are
only brief statements, without description or discussion.
A sixty-five-page bibliography of articles in the legal periodicals and bar association reports. This is by far the largest and best bibliography on judicial selection
that has yet appeared. It is subdivided into fifteen separate subject classifications,
and its value is considerably reduced by the author's effort to classify into one of
these groups many articles that are not so classifiable, as well as many out-and-out
mistakes of classification. Thus, Thomas F. McDonald's comprehensive description
of the Missouri plan, published in the Journal of the American Judicature Society]
a few months after it went into effect, comes under the heading "Unusual Methods
t
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of Confirmation," where nobody would ever think of looking for it. Wigmore's
"New Way to Nominate Supreme Court Justices," 2 which was a proposal that bar
associations maintain honor rolls of men eligible for judicial appointment for the
guidance of the appointing authority, is listed under that same classification rather
than under "Plans for Recommending Candidates to the People or to an Appointing
Power Free to Accept the Recommendation or to Ignore it," for which it was
tailor-made. If the user understands, as he soon will, that the headings do not
mean much, and that every search through the bibliography is a needle and haystack
proposition, he can probably find what he wants somewhere in the sixty-five pages.
An eight-page tabulation of judicial retirement and pension provisions in the states
that have them, together with citations, is interesting and valuable. This is a live
field, and the 1945 legislatures made so many changes that the data here given are
already considerably out of date and should be checked with some more recent
source of information.
There is a long tabulation of the year-to-year changes in methods of judicial
selection in the various states from the time of their founding up to now. To the
history-minded scholar who attacks any problem by first going back to the year one,
this will be a good starting point for reviewing the history of judicial selection in
his state, but the practical value of all this mass of detail of obsolete and forgotten
legislation may be doubted, especially in view of what has been left out of the book.
There is a chapter giving an extended and complete picture of the present English
judiciary, with emphasis on selection and tenure of judges, and another chapter
surveys the practices in France, Italy, Germany, Canada, Latin America and Scandinavia. Elsewhere, the author reviews in minute detail the status of judges under
the Stuarts in England, and the democratic revolution in America a hundred years
ago. Finally, in a long chapter replete with case discussions and citations, he concludes that appointed judges have been more liberal than elected judges.
In Roscoe Pound's introduction the statement is made:
"Itis not the least merit of Mr. Haynes' book that it is not at all propagandist.
In it those who have to consider proposals as to tenure and selection of judges will
find set forth what they will need to consider in the way of plans which have been
tried or are in force or have been proposed, and what statesmen and lawyers and
writers on politics and historians have thought and written on the subject. Thus
they will have before them the materials for intelligent choice." 3
That is precisely what the book does not do, and for lack of which there is still
need for a good text on judicial selection and tenure. Apart from the statistical
data, the pages of text are largely taken up with lengthy discussions, not entirely
irrelevant but "far afield" in the author's own words, on historical and foreign
aspects of very scant value to the bar committee presently confronted with the
question of what to do. He makes no attempt to discuss the various methods that
have been tried and proposed; he says nothing about present conditions in either
elective or appointive states; in his zeal to avoid the appearance of sponsoring one
plan or another he leaves his reader in the dark about them all, save for the references in the bibliography to materials that in many instances ought to have been
part of the text.
Most remarkable of all, the author has at last accomplished what practically
amounts to producing the play entitled Hamlet without the appearance of the
2.
3.

(1939) 22 JouR. Am. JuD. Soc. 207, p. 273.
P. xvii.
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character by the same name. The American Bar Association and its Special Committee on Judicial Selection and Tenure, the adoption of the American Bar Association plan by that organization's House of Delegates, and the Special Committee's
voluminous reports in the annual reports of the American Bar Association, all go
entirely unnoticed from one end of the volume to the other. As thoroughly .as the
author combed the legal literature to compile his large bibliography, and as carefully
as he searched the annual reports of the state bar associations, it is inconceivable that
he actually missed these rich sources of information and materials, and that, knowing
about them, he should have intentionally omitted them is entirely inexplicable. Perhaps they are there after all and merely escaped us somewhere. among the sixty-five
pages of bibliography. However, a mere bibliographical reference to sources and
developments as important as these in the realm of judicial selection is itself grossly
inadequate in any volume that purports to be a full-scale book on the subject.
This book will be a useful one, chiefly on account of its bibliography, but there
still remains a need for a text that is not more than half taken up with background
material and that will contain within its covers the descriptive, argumentative,
illuminating discussions of the various problems of judicial selection and tenure,
analysis and criticism of various proposals, full accounts of experiments such as
that in Missouri and their results, and a general, down to earth picture of developments in the field that will enable a man to read the book and lay it down with
the feeling that he now has some comprehension of what it is all about. That is
neither accomplished nor attempted in this book.
GLENN R. WINrTast
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SALE. By F. de Zuleuta. London & New York: The Oxford

Pp. xi, 265.

$6.50.

This book provides English and American students of comparative law with
selected texts in the original and in translation from the Roman Law of Sale. The
value of the study of Roman law, as the author says, "lies chiefly in its being the
best introduction to a general familiarity with the basic conceptions of most
continental systems" of today, which, as is well known, have their roots in the
Roman law.
The author provides for their historical value some of the pre-Justinian materials
dealing with the law of sale, including brief excerpts from the writings of Cato,
Varro, Cicero and Aulus Gellius and selections from the Institutes of Gaius, from
the Curidian Edits, from the Theodosian Code and other pre-Justinian fragments.
Then follow extensive selections from the Justinian Institutes and Digests which
provide a comprehensive coverage of the subject. The texts set out not only the
law of sale of chattel property but also that concerned with the sale of interests
in land. The method of presentation is to print the Latin text on the upper portion
of the page and the English translation immediately below.
For those readers who will not care to read systematically either in original or
translation the Roman texts but who do wish to obtain a general view of the
t
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subject, Dr. de Zuleuta in the first sixty pages of the book gives in his own words
the principles and rules of the Roman law in an orderly development from the
formation of the contract, through its effects, to the matters of rescission and
variation by subsequent agreement. His own text is fully footnoted to the Roman
texts and after one dips a few times into the Roman texts (most Americans, I fear,
will limit themselves of necessity to the translated passages, as did the writer) he
will be persuaded to read a good many of them not alone to extend his learning
in the subject but because of the entertaining illustrations which the Roman authors
took from the market place and which throw so much light upon the business
activities of the times and the mores of the people. These Roman texts are not
nearly so dry as one might suppose, particularly the passages from the Digests.
At the end of the book are printed the English Sale of Goods Act and the Factors
Act of 1889, the United States Uniform Sales Act and Uniform Conditional Sales
Act and a number of the Articles of the French Civil Code in the original and in
translation. Thus the student has within the covers of this book a very complete
set of tools for the comparative study of the law of sales as developed in ancient
Rome, in a modem European nation and under the common law system of England
and the United States.
GEORGE W. BACONI

SCHOULER DIVORCE MANUAL. By Oscar LeRoy Warren.
1944. Pp. xxxvi, 918. $12.50.

Albany: Banks & Co.

This work consisting in all of over 900 pages, as the title indicates, does not
purport to be a textbook on divorce law. It is a handy reference book which should
be very useful in connection with matrimonial litigation.
In some respects, it is something more than a mere reference book. Part V,
consisting of about 150 pages, deals with Foreign Divorce Judgments, Rulings of the
United States Supreme Court, and Jurisdiction in general. The chapter on Supreme
Court decisions, bringing the discussion up to the first case of Williams v. Nortk
Carolina1 is a fairly successful attempt to simplify a confusing problem. This chapter
will give the practitioner a background on this subject which is concise and timesaving. In a book of this kind, the Table of Contents and the Index are especially
important and it is noteworthy that in this work they seem to have been thoroughly
and intelligently prepared.
FREDERICK L. KANEIt
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